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THE ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES
E. L. OLIVERt
Reappearance of open industrial warfare on a large scale, in 1933 and
1934,1 has forced upon the attention of industrial and political leaders the
problem of finding some method for securing amicable adjustment of labor
disputes. Dramatic local strikes, culminating in the San Francisco general
strike, have been followed by threats of nation-wide strikes in various indus-
tries. The textile walk-out, covering perhaps the largest area of any strike in
our industrial history (with the exception of national railway strikes), is an
indication of what may easily happen in the steel, automobile, and other of
our great industries. It is true that we have had periods of violent labor
conflict before, but there has never been a time when the symptoms and
vigorous expression of industrial unrest have been so general and so serious.
What happened in Toledo and Minneapolis may be happening tomorrow in
any one of our cities.
It would be a serious mistake, however, to gauge the nature or extent of
the labor conflict, or to base any public policy with reference to labor disputes,
solely upon strikes or lockouts. In fact, the strike bears about the same
relationship to the labor problem as war does to international trade. Almost
every contact between employer and employee has in it some element of
controversy. Questions of wages, hours, and working conditions are being
settled daily in every union and non-union establishment in the country.
Individual or collective employment contracts are being made or changed
continually; workers are being hired, furloughed, or dismissed. Men are
being promoted, demoted, and disciplined by their employers, and are pro-
testing when they consider themselves unjustly treated. It is only when a
substantial group of workers act concertedly in such a protest, and when no
settlement satisfactory to both employer and employee groups is reached,
that the strike or lockout results.
Strike prevention, consequently, is not the only-nor the primary-
public concern in labor controversies. Employers may be satisfied with a
policy which would forestall collective action by employees, or break strikes
when they cannot be prevented. The community interest is much broader
and much more fundamental than this. Entirely apart from questions of
abstract justice to the parties directly involved, labor disputes must be con-
sidered in the light of their complex effect upon the welfare of the entire
community. Any method of settling such disputes must be judged by its
t A.-B., 1918, University of Minnesota; Director of the Research Department, Brother-
hood of Railway Clerks.
i. Strikes and lockouts reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics caused loss of 2,730,000
man-days in 193o, and 13,455,000 man-days in 1933. Time lost in the first four months of
1934 was more than four times as great as in the same period of 1933. 38 MONTHLY LABOR
REv. (U. S. Dept. of Labor, 1934) 1377.
(206)
ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES
total effect; simple repression or a policy of preventing strikes at all costs
will not meet the situation.
Contrary as it may be to the general opinion, the "public" is much more
concerned in the outcome of labor disputes than it is in the means by which
the disputes are conducted. An individual strike or lockout may cause public
inconvenience, even hardship, but in the long run and over the whole labor
field the terms upon which controversies are settled have an incomparably
greater effect than the local and temporary dislocations of the period of open
conflict. Wage and production losses during stoppages are negligible com-
pared with the wages paid and the industrial output during the life of collec-
tive labor agreements.2 The working and living conditions of millions of
people are governed directly by union agreements; and conditions in non-
union establishments, though less favorable to the employees, are largely
determined by what union labor has secured. The income of every other
group in the community, and general business conditions, are but little less
directly affected. The great bulk of our urban population is in some way
concerned in the terms upon which labor disputes are settled. Public policy
in handling labor disputes, therefore, should be directed not only toward
strike prevention, but also toward the making of sound and equitable settle-
ments of the issues involved.
Before attempting an assay of arbitration as a means of settling labor
disputes, it will perhaps be well to consider the types of disputes normally
arising in industry, and the general methods of disposing of them.
Types of Labor Controversies
Labor disputes usually involve one or both of two types of issues. For
a proper understanding of these issues, one must look at their origins-at the
establishment in which there is no labor organization, and no apparent labor
dispute. In the typical plant of this class, the employer of the pre-depression
era hired, fired, promoted, demoted, disciplined and rewarded whom he chose.
The number of workers, their wages, hours and working conditions, their
age, sex, nationality, and physical qualifications, their principles--even their
religion or politics-were his to determine in dealing with his personnel. If
industrial conditions or other considerations induced him to bargain, he dealt
with the individual employee. Dissatisfaction in such an establishment was
ordinarily expressed only very cautiously, because each employee knew the
imminent danger of discharge. The employer usually thought and said that
his employees were satisfied, when as a matter of fact they were more often
simply frightened into silence. When low wages, long hours, or other work-
ing conditions did bring expressions of protest, the individual employee
2. Assuming an average of 2,ooo,ooo people working under union agreements in 1933, the
man-days worked would have totalled six hundred million, the time lost in strikes, thirteen
and a half million.
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learned to talk only to those whom he could trust, and to get a group inter-
ested before any action was taken. Advice and help were often, but not
always, sought from or offered by already organized workers. Such a move-
ment might be started because of a desire to raise wages or shorten hours;
when the employer learned of it, his standard reaction was to discharge the
"agitators" or "ringleaders". At that point, the movement for increasing
wages was usually subordinated, and the employees instead demanded the
reinstatement of the men discharged. The employer frequently refused to
meet with the committee or other representatives of his employees, and the
employees from then on also asked for the right to speak through union
representatives in conference with the employer. Reinstatement of the
workers discharged meant simply "recognition of the right to organize".
Meeting with the committee representing the employees meant "recognition
of the union". These two demands, it will be seen, are quite different from
the original demand for wage increases or shortening of hours; the one type
of demand is for specific changes in employment conditions, the second is for
a limitation of the absolute power of the employer.
Disputes thus arise out of demands for increased wages, shortened
hours, payment for overtime, fixed starting or quitting times, proper lighting
or sanitary conditions; but they also arise out of demands for the right to
organize, union recognition, union participation in dismissals or discipline,
regulation of promotion and demotion, elimination of discrimination against
women, etc. Union progress, where collective action has been successful,
has consisted not only in the shortening of hours and raising of wages, but
also in the steady limitation of the power of the employer over the qmployees.
These two primary types of issues in labor disputes must be kept in mind in
considering the whole problem of peaceful adjustment of employer-employee
relationships.
3
In addition to this classification upon the basis of the issues involved,
labor disputes should also be considered from the standpoint of the form 
in
which they arise. Where labor is organized, wages and working conditions
are ordinarily fixed by definite agreements. Disputes may arise, in the first
place, in making or modifying these basic agreements; they may arise, 
also,
in the interpretation or application of the agreements in specific situations.
Wage and rules agreements usually have either a definite termination
date, or a provision that they may be terminated by either party upon 
stipu-
lated notice. Proposals to change basic agreements, ordinarily, must 
be made
in advance of the termination date or in accordance with whatever 
notice is
provided for termination.
4 Disputes arising out of such proposals are thus
3- For an instructive analogy between the 
development of political democracy and the
extension of collective bargaining see Leiserson, Constitutional 
Go'vernmwnt in American In-
dustries (March 1922) 12 Am. EcoN. REv.; March 
Supp. 56.
4. At least 30 days' notice must be given of intended 
changes in wages, rules, or working
conditions of railway workers. RAMWAY LABOR Acr, 44 STAT. 582, § 6 (1926), 
45 U. S. C.
A. § i56 (Supp. 1933).
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definite and formal; they generally involve matters of considerable impor-
tance to the entire group.
On the other hand, differences over the interpretation or application
of bmsic agreements are arising continually. They are usually handled infor-
mally at first, the complaints being simply to the effect that one party or the
other is not observing the agreement in some particular. Typically they
involve one employee or a small group; they relate, usually, to a specific
managerial or employee practice. The interest of both employer and em-
ployee in such disputes is generally best served by a quick determination of
the issue, since ordinarily there is little at stake. Confusion and uncertainty
arising from a delayed settlement of the meaning of an agreement might very
easily do more harm than a quick decision which fails of perfect justice or
accuracy.
The term "labor dispute" has been used above to apply only to contro-
versies which find more or less formal expression. But there is a latent
controversy which must be recognized. Employees who are afraid to protest
against wages or working conditions, or who have learned through experience
the futility or danger of protesting, may be nevertheless in disagreement with
their employer. It is characteristic of non-union establishments that employee
dissatisfaction finds no real expression, and is ignored or suppressed by the
management; the smouldering discontent in such plants is not only a threat
to "industrial peace", but it also interferes with efficient operation. If peace-
ful methods of settling labor disputes are ever to prevail, some way will have
to be found to permit free expression and adjustment of employee complaints
in establishments where they are now smothered. It may be possible to con-
ceal employee discontent and postpone adjustment of grievances by prevent-
ing or suppressing genuine labor organization. But such postponement only
adds to the dynamite accumulating for the ultimate explosion; it is not a
settlement of the questions inherent in employer-employee relationships.
Methods of Settling Labor Disputes
Labor disputes are carried on, and eventually ended, in one of three
different ways, or a combination of them. These different processes, which
are at once ways of disputing and ways of reaching a settlement are (i) by
direct negotiation, (2) by direct action, and (3) by mediation and arbitra-
tion. Governmental intervention sometimes settles labor controversies by
direct statutory action, as, e. g., the Adamson Act,5 which established an
eight-hour day for railroad employees, or by securing an injunction against
the railway shop employees, as was done in 1922. The normal handling of
labor dispites, however, begins with conferences between the parties, and
where the question is not disposed of in conference, direct action or handling
through mediation and arbitration normally follows. Arbitration as a
5. 39 STAT. 721 (i916), 45 U. S. C. A. § 65 (1928).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
method of settling labor disputes can be evaluated only against the whole
background of its alternative or supplementary processes.
By far the greater number of disputes arising in union establishments
are adjusted by direct negotiations between the union and the employer.
Every labor organization handles a steady stream of employee complaints,
and all but a small proportion of them are settled quickly with the immediate
supervisor of the person complaining. Of those which are not settled "on
the ground", the greater part are agreed upon between higher officials of the
union and the management. Negotiation is less successful in handling major
disputes arising out of requests for changes in basic wages or working con-
ditions, but even there most controversies are settled by agreement directly
between the parties.
Direct negotiation is by all odds the most satisfactory method of settling
labor disputes. The face-to-face contact of employers and union representa-
tives, while at first it may cause distrust because of superficial differences in
conduct, ultimately makes for mutual understanding. Each side comes to
know the problems of the other, and to think of their differences in terms of
their common interests. Management representatives come to understand
the reality and the strength of employee dissatisfaction; union representatives
come to realize the limitations imposed upon management by business con-
ditions and by boards of directors. Personal friendliness develops without
any sacrifice of the interests of the parties represented, and in such an atmos-
phere each side will do everything possible to settle the dispute with the
minimum of hardship to the other. As has been said, union proposals very
frequently include a request for an extension of employee control over work-
ing conditions, or rather an extension of the area of joint control. Where
the habit of discussing and deciding controversies has been well developed,
union representatives are better able to participate in joint supervision of
working conditions-and management officials are much more inclined to
accept such union participation. The process of direct negotiation is not
only highly successful in settling controversies, but it is also creating other
values of the greatest social significance by its development of good will
and cooperative activity between employer and employee.
Direct negotiation, however, is not always successful. The interests or
demands of the board of directors cannot always be reconciled with the
interests or demands of the union membership; sometimes it is impossible
to find a satisfactory basis for compromise. Where direct negotiation upon
a dispute fails to bring settlement, or when there is no established procedure
for carrying on such negotiations, the employer or the workers may proceed
to "direct action".
Here, too, we need a broader conception of the nature of industrial
conflict. The employees, through their union, have two main types of direct
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action-the strike and the boycott. The employer, because of his position at
the head of his establishment, has not only the power to lock out all union
members, but he has also the power to put into effect his decision. A union,
aski:g for higher wages, and denied the increase by the employer, cannot
simply write out increased pay checks; but the employer, asking for a wage
cut and unable to secure union consent, can instruct the timekeeper to put
the reduction into effect. The union, asking for reinstatement of an em-
ployee it considers unjustly discharged, cannot arbitrarily put him back on
the payroll; the employer, however, can stop the pay of any employee he
wants to discharge, even though the union does not agree that the discharge
is justified. Where the employer takes action, after final disagreement with
the union, the organization has only one recourse-the strike. In principle,
the action of an employer in putting a decision into effect over the protest
of his employees is as much "direct action" and open conflict as is the strike.
Because wage cuts or other employer action may be made quietly at a time
when the workers are unable to strike, this type of industrial warfare escapes
public attention; but when industrial or other controlling conditions change,
and the workers are again able to strike effectively, the resulting conflicts are
more bitter, more prolonged, and more destructive because of the arbitrary
action of the employer taken when the workers were defenseless. Direct
action by one side or the other, especially if it takes the form of a strike, is
the most spectacular method of settling labor disputes, but it is also the least
satisfactory. Where dependence is placed upon direct action, the tendency
is for settlements to be extreme in their provisions; in times of prosperity,
or labor shortage, or other condition making the employer relatively unable
to resist union pressure, strikes or threats of strike can win concessions not
justified by other factors. On the other hand, in time of depression, or
seasonal unemployment, or in the absence of organization, the employer can
force wage reductions or delay justified increases, and can put into effect
working conditions below standard. Drastic action by either party in such
situations tends to create in the other a desire for retaliation, just as over-
whelming victory in international warfare usually leads to unjust peace
terms and a later war of "revenge". Apart, therefore, from all considera-
tions of the cost and public inconvenience of strikes or lockouts, the use of
arbitrary power by either employer or union unsettles industry and is dan-
gerous to everyone concerned.
Definition and History of Industrial Arbitration
The variety of definitions of arbitration indicate the difficulty of saying
precisely what arbitration is, in the industrial field. 6 Employer and employee
6. For definitions of arbitration in labor disputes see 29 MONTHLY LABOR Ra. (U. S.
Dept. of Labor, Nov. 1929) 14; 17 REPORT OF INDUSTMAL COMMISSION (1900) lxxv; BLUm,
LABOR EcoNoMIcs (925) 239.
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attitudes differ greatly from industry to industry; the length of experience
with collective bargaining varies widely; the public interest in labor contro-
versies varies from time to time, and from industry to industry. These and
other factors have been reflected in the forms set up in experiments with
arbitration machinery, and it is no easy task to decide what is the essence of
arbitration. No definition can include all the variants.
Arbitration, it may be said, is the reference of a dispute to some tribunal
outside of the parties immediately interested, for a decision which will in
fact be binding. Not all arbitration is by third parties; not all arbitration is
undertaken by joint action; not all arbitration decisions are accepted in
advance; and, finally, not all arbitrations involve issues upon which the parties
are in disagreement. Arbitration boards frequently function as mediators,
or conciliators; mediators and conciliators frequently function as arbitrators.
Arbitration boards, given a specific dispute to decide, may evade direct
decision but lay down a rule, susceptible of definite application, which will
settle the controversy. Disputes in which one or both parties must escape
the responsibility for decision, although both are agreed upon what the deci-
sion should be, are not infrequently referred to and "decided" by arbitration
boards. The composition and operation of industrial arbitration boards
include adaptations to every variant among the disputes they handle.
This broad definition of arbitration includes many types of settlement
not usually thought of as coming within the meaning of the word. But the
essence of all such settlements is the same. The dispute is taken away from
those too closely concerned in its early handling. It is investigated by persons
not to be immediately affected by the terms of its settlement, and only indi-
rectly if at all responsible to the employees and management officials involved
in the controversy. These new persons, primarily interested in finding a
basis upon which a workable adjustment can be made, have sufficient prestige,
influence, or power to make their decisions practically effective. Arbitration
as it has developed in the labor field is a combination of these elements.
Illustrations of these variations will bring out the point more clearly.
The first arbitration board under the Hart, Schaffner & Marx agreement, in
1911, functioned successfully through a very difficult period with one repre-
sentative each from the union and the company, and no "neutrals". 7 The
national agreement between the International Typographical Union and the
American Newspaper Publishers' Association provides for arbitrations by
two-party boards,8 with the provision that a third party may be called in if
the two-party board is unsuccessful. Railway labor disputes may be handled
by the United States Mediation Board, and by a Presidential Emergency
7. CLOTHING WORcERS OF CHICAGO (Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 1922) 50.
8. TRAcY, HISTORY OF THE TYpoGRAIPIcAL UNION (913) 647. See also Low, Civic
Federation and Industrial Peace (Nov. 1912) 44 AmALs 13.
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Board, under the Railway Labor Act," without the request of both parties-
even without the request of either party.10 The Joint Bureau of Standards
in the Cleveland Ladies' Garment industry fixed piece rates by time-studies
of the disputed operations." The decisions of the United States Railroad
Labor Board were rarely accepted in advance, and the Transportation Act 12
under which the Board functioned did not make its decisions binding; never-
theless, very few of the 4000 decisions of the Board were not put into effect
(those few, however, being among the most important 13).
All of these processes are arbitration, and the term should be understood
in a sense broad enough to comprehend them all.
History
The reference of disputes to arbitration appears fairly early in American
Labor history, but most of its significant development has been since 19oo.
Arbitration of a dispute involving iron puddlers in Pittsburgh, in 1865, is
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.' 4 Shoe workers of Lynn, Mass.,
are reported to have arbitrated a dispute in I87O. Between 188o and 189o
bricklayers in New York, Boston, and Chicago entered into arbitration agree-
ments with the associations of their employers, which agreements functioned
very well until i9oo.16 The Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric
Railway Employees already had its present arbitration policy well devel-
oped,' 7 and local unions of several other internationals had by 19oo secured
agreements providing for some sort of arbitration of disputes arising during
their continuance.
Three groups of workers are of outstanding importance in the develop-
ment of arbitration since I9OO-those in the printing trades, the needle
trades, and the railway industry. Passage of the Erdman Act,' 8 in June,
1898, marks the real beginning of arbitration in the railway industry;' 9
action taken by the International Typographical Union, in its 19oo conven-
tion, led to the conclusion of an arbitration agreement in 19O1 between the
union and the American Newspaper Publishers' Association which in its
essentials is still in effect; 20 and the strike of clothing workers in the Hart,
9. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), 45 U. S. C. A. § 151 (Supp. 1933).
I0. RAILWAY LABOR AcT, 44 STAT. 582, § 6, 586, § IO (1926), 45 U. S. C. A. §§ I56, I6o
(Supp. 1933).
ii. LEVINE, WOMEN'S GARMENT WORKERS (924) 370.
12. 41 STAT. 456 (1920), 45 U. S. C. A. § I31 (1928).
13. Including the decisions reducing the rates of shop employees, in 1922 (3 R. L. B. 423,
Decision 1036) and the series relating to the choice of employee representatives on the Penn-
sylvania Railroad (2 R. L. B. 207-223, Decisions 218, 219, 220).
14. 29 MONTHLY LABOR REv. (U. S. Dept. of Labor, Nov. 1929) 16.
15. 17 REPORT OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION (90) 406.
16. Id. at 376 et seq.
17. Id. at 419, 420.
18. 30 STAT. 424 (1898), 45 U. S. C. A. § ioi (1928).
ig. Chambers, Achieverents of Federal Mediation (1918) 7 AcAD. of POL. SCL PRoc.,
N. Y. C. 3-5.
20. TRAcY, HISTORY OF THE TyPOGRAPHIcAL UNION (913) 645-651.
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Schaffner & Marx factory in Chicago, in 191o, led to the signing of an
arbitration agreement covering that establishment, 21 beginning the now
extensive use of arbitration for settling disputes in the needle trades. Many
local unions in other industries provide for arbitration of controversies aris-
ing out of interpretation or application of basic agreements, but the develop-
ment has been more consistent, and more the object of definitely formulated
union and management policy, in these three industries than in any others.
A very incomplete tabulation of arbitration decisions in the United
States, made by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, lists 54 decisions as having
been made from 1865 to 1914, 98 decisions from 1915 to 192o, and 271
from 1921 to 1929.22 The purpose of the Bureau's study was such as to
exclude many decisions, and only a fraction of arbitration awards handed
down have been reported to the federal government. But the increase is
not overstated by the figures given. In the railway industry, from 18g8 to
1913 there were 12 arbitration decisions in labor disputes ;23 from 1927 to
1933, inclusive, there were 64 arbitration decisions (excluding those involv-
ing only grievances) .24 Twenty-seven major disputes on the railways were
submitted to arbitration in the one year 1927, twice as many as in the entire
fifteen-year period 1898-1913.
With the adoption of the National Industrial Recovery Act, in 1933,
the problem of settling labor disputes entered into a wholly new phase. It
is still too early to decide what will come from the famous Section 7a, but the
confusion that has attended attempts to enforce its provisions indicates that
the law needs clarification, and that the machinery for administering it is not
suited to the job.
Bases of Arbitration
Arbitration of labor disputes in the United States, before the passage
of the N. I. R. A., was principally a result of agreements between em-
ployers and labor unions. Attempts at compulsory arbitration had failed,2
and the conciliation work of state and federal labor departments was far from
perfectly effective. Even the Railway Labor Act of 1926, under which
railway labor controversies were being arbitrated, was more of an agreement
between managements and unions than imposed federal regulation. 26
Submission of disputes to arbitration was for the most part voluntary.
The United States Board of Mediation had and has the power, as the Rail-
21. CLOTHING WoRKms oF CHICAGO (Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 1922) 49.
22. 29 MONTHLY LABOR REV. (U. S. Dept. of Labor, Nov. 1929) I5.
23. Chambers, loc. cit. supra note 15.
24. U. S. BOARD OF MEDIATION, ANNUAL REP. (1933) 7.
25. The Kansas Industrial Relations Court Law was declared unconstitutional, insofar as
it made arbitration compulsory. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.
S. 522 (1923).
26. See reports of House and Senate Committees; H. R. REP. No. 328, 69th Cong., ist
Sess., Ser. No. 9463 (1926); SEN. REP. No. 222, 69th Cong., Ist Sess., Ser. No. 23o6 (1926).
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road Labor Board had had under the Transportation Act of 192o, to inter-
vene in labor disputes uninvited. Its intervention, upon its own initiative or
upon the request of either party, postpones direct action until attempts to
sett!- disputes by mediation have failed, and the parties refuse to arbitrate.
Even at this stage in the dispute, direct action may be further delayed by
appointment of a Presidential Emergency Board, under the law, to investi-
gate and report upon the controversy. The Board must report within thirty
days of its appointment. Neither party may move in the dispute until thirty
days after the report of the Emergency Board; but thereafter there is no
compulsion exercised under the law. In theory, the acceptance of the results
of this process of investigation, mediation, and arbitration is voluntary; in
practice, the delay, and the weight of recommendations by the United States
Board of Mediation, or by a Presidential Emergency Board, make labor
acceptance almost compulsory. Railway managements are under somewhat
less pressure, apparently, to accept the arbitration services of the Board of
Mediation, or to follow the recommendations of Presidential Emergency
Boards.
Aside from the railway industry, arbitration agreements or settlements
in the United States were wholly voluntary. Each side, it is true, usually
acted with a healthy respect for the bargaining power of the other, and in
the belief that settlements secured through arbitration would in the long run
be as satisfactory as those gained by direct action. There was, too, a realiza-
tion that both management and union lost in public esteem through their
failures to compose their differences amicably. The terms of arbitration
agreements, and the decision to enter into them, were made by the parties
without legal compulsion. But awards of arbitration boards were final and
binding, unless provision was made for appeal to another board for review.
Arbitration Machinery
Several types of arbitration machinery have been created by agreement
or by law in the United States. The machinery set up has recognized the
distinction in forms of disputes, noted above; there are boards for handling
complaints or grievances, and separate boards for the arbitration of major
disputes. Agreements between the International Typographical Union and
the local and national associations of newspaper publishers provide for three
kinds of arbitration boards-one local board for complaints and grievances;
a local board for wage and rules decisions; and a national board for review of
local wage and rules decisions on appeal. The national board also handles
certain questions, such as that of appointing impartial chairmen, upon which
the local boards cannot agree. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers' agree-
ment with Chicago manufacturers establishes a Trade Board, to handle
grievances and complaints, and an Arbitration Board to hear appeals from
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the Trade Board decision, and to decide general wage and rules questions
arising during the life of the agreement. Under the Railway Labor Act, as
amended in 1934, 27 a national board of adjustment is created to hear and
decide disputes growing out of interpretation and application of basic agree-
ments; decision of this board is final and binding. Separate provision is
made for arbitration boards to handle disputes growing out of proposals for
basic changes in wages or rules.
Not all arbitration machinery is classifiable under the heading of arbi-
tration boards. The existence of an arbitration board, and the creation of
precedents by its decisions, speedily gives to mediation and conciliation
processes most of the characteristics of arbitration. Deputies subordinate
to the Trade Board under the agreements of the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers in Chicago, and mediators on the staff of the United States Media-
tion Board, for example, are familiar with the standard decisions on questions
which have been handled through arbitration. Functions of persons such as
these make them a part of the arbitration machinery, and frequently short
cut the arbitration process. Disputes may be withdrawn or settled upon
information or advice of mediators; of 2113 cases submitted to the United
States Board of Mediation from 1927 to 1933, 645 were settled in mediation,
549 were withdrawn, and 269 were settled by arbitration .2  Disposition of
the first two groups was certainly largely determined by what had happened
in earlier arbitrations of similar disputes. The mediator is properly a part
of arbitration machinery in another sense; he does precisely what a good
board of arbitration does in most of the disputes submitted. In explaining
the position of each party to the other, in trying to find a middle ground, in
urging agreement on a reasonable compromise, the mediator and the arbi-
trator perform the same function.
Another function of the United States Mediation Board, and of other
governmental agencies since 1933, is in the nature of arbitration. Among
the most difficult labor disputes to settle are those arising out of the demand
for union recognition. Employers are usually of the opinion--or profess to
be-that there is no desire among their employees for collective bargaining,
or for representation by an "outside" union. If the employees, through some
one who claims the right to speak for them, ask for changes in wages or
working conditions, and the employer refuses to meet with the representative
of the employees, there is little basis for negotiation or arbitration. Direct
action, by. employer or employees or both, follows quickly-and the fighting
in such disputes is frequently violent.
In the effort to find a peaceful settlement for disputes over union recog-
nition, the Railroad Labor Board worked out a method of submitting the
question to the employees by secret ballot. The Board of Mediation devel-
27. P. L. No. 442, 73d Cong., ist Sess. (i934).
28. U. S. BD. OF MEDIATION, ANNUAL REP. (933) 6.
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oped this technique, and under the Railway Labor Act as now amended some
such method for determining employee representation is almost compulsory
in disputes over union recognition.2 9  The dispute then centers about the
rule- relative to balloting; such questions as the list of properly eligible voters,
the methods for guaranteeing secrecy, the counting of the ballots, etc., must
be decided. The Board of Mediation has the power, if the parties cannot
agree, to fix election rules for these employee ballots.
This process, which involves the reference of a dispute to some objective
standard for settlement, is not different from the use of such standards by
arbitration boards in other disputes. Changes in living costs, wages of
employees not involved in the dispute under consideration, time-studies of
operations, etc., have often been used as the criteria for settlements, in lieu
of a direct decision by the arbitrators. Employee balloting on union recog-
nition is of this same nature, and is a special case of arbitration.
Use of this method of determining employee representation involves
the acceptance of two principles, first that the employees have a right to bar-
gain collectively if they desire, and second that they have a right to bargain
through whatever representative or other method they may choose. By
grounding public policy upon adoption of these two principles, a way has
been found for peaceful settlement of the most difficult and most dangerous
type of labor disputes.
Composition of Arbitration Boards
Arbitration boards established by agreements or by law vary in size, but
always have equal representation of employer and employees. Trade Boards
in the Chicago clothing industry had at first ii, and later 5 representatives
each of union and management;30 joint committees for handling grievances
in the Typographical Union agreements with newspaper publishers consist
of two representatives of each party; boards of adjustment in the railway
industry had no fixed number, under the original Railway Labor Act, and
under the law as now amended the national board has 18 (divided into four
sections of 5,-5, 5, and 3) representatives for each group.31 Arbitration
boards for handling wage and rule changes usually have one representative
of each party, although the Railway Labor Act provides two representatives
where that is preferred. Boards handling grievances usually try to arrive
at decisions without calling on a neutral party; where a decision cannot be
reached in that manner, the neutral member of the board serves as chairman.
Under the Railway Labor Act, boards may consist of three or six members,
and the larger boards have two neutral arbitrators.
32
29. RAILWAY LABOR AcT, P. L. No. 442, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1934) § 2.
30. CLOTHING WoRKEas OF CHICAGO (Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 1922) 55, 57.
31. RAILWAY LAuOR ACT, P. L. No. 442, 73d Cong., ist Sess. (1934) § 3.
32. There have been several deadlock decisions in six-member boards. One of these was
a wage case involving one class of train service employees throughout the west. In such dead-
locks, unless later sessions of the board of arbitration result in settlement, the members simply
agree to disagree, and the dispute is left unsettled.
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Choice of Board Members
Each party to a labor dispute selects its own representatives upon the
arbitration board. In handling grievances, these members are usually union
and management officials. For arbitration boards handling wage and rules
questions, or appeals from local and grievance boards, outsiders sometimes
represent union or management. Thus Mr. Clarence Darrow represented
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (then the United Garment Workers)
in their first arbitration proceedings under the Hart, Schaffner & Marx
agreement. Former Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson represented the
Brotherhood of Railway Clerks in an arbitration with the New York Central
Railway, in 1926. The Board of Referees, which arbitrated disputes in the
Cleveland ladies garment industry in 1919 and thereafter, was composed of
three men, none of whom represented either employer or union. These, how-
ever, are exceptions; the general rule is that the union is represented by some
one of its own officers on boards of arbitration, and the management by
someone from its personnel staff.
Choice of impartial members is of course the big problem in the forma-
tion of arbitration boards. Arbitration agreements sometimes name the
impartial member of the boards; sometimes government officials are asked
to choose neutrals; the most common arrangement, however, is for the
partisan members first to try to agree upon an impartial chairman. If that
is not possible, selection of the chairman may be left to a higher arbitration
board (as in the International Typographical Union agreements referred to
above) or to public officials. Under the Railway Labor Act, the Mediation
Board appoints neutral members of arbitration boards when the parties are
unable to agree.
Arbitration succeeds or fails with the choice of impartial members of
boards. The history of arbitration agreements discloses many instances
where the entire idea was discredited because of improper conduct by the
neutral arbitrator. 33 But it is not simply in showing partiality that the "third
party" can bring about the failure of arbitration. Many arbitrators enter
upon their duties with the high-minded belief that they know better than
either union or management exactly what the situation requires. A few, a
very few, may actually have a better understanding of the dispute than do
the people involved; even among these few it is rare that a neutral can put
across his conception in a way to avoid antagonism from one or both sides.
Where the neutral member understands that he is only a special kind of
mediator, and that his job will be best done if he lays a basis for handling
disputes which will make his services unnecessary in the future, his chances
of satisfying everyone concerned are much greater. It is true, however, that
many disputes simply cannot be compromised or mediated; the arbitrator
33. For an example, see TRAcY, HIsTQRY oF rHE TyPoa iEticAL UNION (1913) 738-744.
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frequently must take a stand with one or the other party. For such a situa-
tion the neutral man must have some strength of character; there are some-
times very stormy scenes at the executive sessions of arbitration boards. The
arbit± ator who yields to blustering or who weakens after he has made a
decision not only ends his own usefulness but also causes distrust of the
whole arbitration process.
Direct political appointment of arbitrators, or the use of men holding
political office to arbitrate disputes not involving public employees, has proven
to be a mistake. The Railroad Labor Board, all of its members appointed
by the President of the United States, might have been much more successful
if its personnel had been differently selected. Public utility commissions,
acting as labor arbitrators, leave a great deal to be desired. On the other
hand, appointees of the United States Board of Mediation have been very
successful in handling railway labor disputes, and with one exception there
has been no serious charge of bias or partiality. The Board, although politi-
cally appointed, has been non-political in its appointments; the men selected
for arbitrators have included federal, state, and local judges, economists,
statisticians, etc.
Procedure in Arbitration
Hearings before labor arbitration boards are usually very informal.
Representatives of both sides appearing before the board are allowed the
widest latitude in the evidence or arguments introduced, and the manner of
presentation. Regulations governing procedure are only general in most
arbitration agreements, but in others-notably those of the typographical
union-detailed provisions are made for arbitration board hearings.
Procedure under the Railway Labor Act is more formal than those
under trade agreements. Opening statements by each side outline the issues
and the evidence to be introduced; witnesses are sworn, and examined and
cross-examined in something approaching court-room style. The petitioner
opens and closes, in both evidence and argument. Awards of the arbitration
boards are filed with the clerk of the federal court in the district where the
hearings are held. Any award can be impeached, on grounds enumerated in
the law; unless petition for impeachment is filed within ten days after the
award is handed down, the law provides that "the court shall enter judgment
on the award, which judgment shall be final and conclusive on the parties".
Willingness to Arbitrate
Arbitration in the United States is voluntary, except in the handling of
grievance disputes in the railway industry. In considering submission of
disputes to arbitration, the parties are influenced by many factors. Relative
bargaining power of the employer and the union, for example, will affect the
readiness of one or the other to agree to arbitration. Business conditions,
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directly as well as in their bearing upon relative bargaining power, make the
parties to a dispute willing or unwilling to arbitrate. The psychology of
workers or employers, their mutual confidence or distrust, the relation of
either group or of the industry to the "public"-all affect the readiness of the
parties to permit an "outsider" to decide their controversies.
An illustration of the effect of business conditions and relative bargain-
ing power upon arbitration is provided in the history of the Railway Labor
Act since its passage. The United States Board of Mediation, immediately
after its creation in 1926, received for handling a large number of disputes
which had accumulated or had been pending with the former Railroad Labor
Board, and has been receiving for mediation most of the disputes which
could not be settled by direct negotiation since that time. In the following
table, taken from the annual report of the United States Board of Mediation
for the fiscal year 1933, 34 "C" refers to major disputes, "GC" to grievance
cases.
NUMBER OF CASES
On Hand and Cases Settled (Total) Closed, Refusal
Received By By With- to Arbitrate
Year C GC Total Mediation Arbitration drawn C GC Total
1927 265 7 272 57 27 24 0 0 0
1928 252 32 284 84 14 45 0 0 0
1929 172 69 241 64 Io 62 9 0 9
1930 155 250 405 73 12 86 3 0 3
1931 171 428 599 98 115* 8I 1 0 I
1932 228 461 689 139 51 128 47 33 8o
1933 175 621 796 130 40 123 39 96 135
* 113 of this total were grievances, and of them more than go were in one group of dis-
putes submitted by the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks and the Railway Express Agency.
The effect of the depression was, first, to increase the number of dis-
putes to reach the Board of Mediation-indicating not only an increase in
disputes originating, but also the decreasing effectiveness of direct negotia-
tion. The increase in disputes was especially marked in grievance cases, of
which 102 were received by the Board in 1929, and 507 in 1933. A second
effect of the depression was delay in securing settlements of disputes. A
third effect was that the proportion settled by mediation and arbitration
decreased. Finally, the refusal of the parties (here, as a matter of fact, the
railroad managements) to arbitrate labor disputes became very marked in
1932 and 1933.
Accumulation of unsettled grievances caused a very acute situation to
develop in railway labor relations in 1933 and 1934. One large railroad was
threatened with a general strike of all its employees if it did not adjust out-
standing grievances. As a result of the condition that had developed, the
unions in 1934 asked Congress to amend the law to improve the machinery
34. U. S. BD. OF MEDIATION, ANNUAL REP. (1933) 6.
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for the settlement of grievances growing out of the application or interpre-
tation of basic wage and rules agreements. After a vigorous campaign,
carried right up to the closing minutes of the last session of Congress, the
rail-. ay unions succeeded in having the Railway Labor Act modified to make
arbitration of grievance disputes (by a National Board of Adjustment if
other machinery was not voluntarily set up by the parties) virtually com-
pulsory.
Success of Arbitration
Arbitration, as a means of settling labor disputes, has to meet several
tests. First, does it prevent open labor conflict? Second, does it secure rea-
sonably fair settlements? Third, does it make for better relations in industry
by preserving direct negotiation? Fourth, can it be developed to handle all
types of disputes?
Strike Prevention
Arbitration of labor disputes has not always prevented strikes. There
have been strikes, like that of the railway shop crafts in 1922, against awards
of arbitrators. Sympathy strikes have been called by unions having arbitra-
tion agreements. Outlaw strikes sometimes follow unpopular arbitration
awards. It is true, also, that employers sometimes fail to live up to the terms
of arbitration agreements, and fail to put into effect decisions they had agreed
to accept.
But a consideration of conditions in the industries where disputes are
now regularly arbitrated cannot fail to bring conviction that in the arbitration
process we have the answer to the problem of strike prevention. The stormy
history of the needle trades, in all centers where arbitration agreements are
in effect, has given way to a peaceful and orderly settlement of disputes.
That this is not due to a change in the industry, nor in the attitude of the
workers, is proven by the strikes that still occur where arbitration agreements
are not in effect. One of the most vigorously contested strikes in the history
of the men's clothing industry took place in 1925 when a large clothing con-
cern, with factories in Chicago and New York, decided not to renew its
agreement with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers; in other markets,
where the employees have been unorganized or are not covered by arbitration
agreements, there have been strikes with all the characteristics of the early
battles in the industry. The railroad industry, which saw many serious
strikes under the imperfect labor provisions of the Transportation Act
between 192o and 1922, under the Railway Labor Act weathered the depres-
sion and the first major controversy of the recovery period without one stop-
page. Arbitration, although weakened by management attitude during the
depression, is firmly established upon the railroads. The International Typo-
graphical Union, in its strike to enforce the forty-four-hour agreement in its
trade, showed that the peace which had existed with so few breaches between
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the union and employing printers was not due to the weakness of the organiza-
tion. The Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Em-
ployees can and does strike where arbitration agreements are not in effect.
Open industrial conflict in these industries shows that the peace which has
been secured in certain areas or during certain periods must be attributed to
the development of the arbitration process.
Arbitration Settlements
On the whole, arbitration settlements have been satisfactory to everyone
concerned. Individual decisions have caused strong protest, and the attitudes
of some arbitrators have been difficult to understand. Sometimes neither
side is satisfied with arbitration decisions, and the writer has known of
instances where the indicated decision of the neutral arbitrator was so far out
of line with the necessities of the situation that employer and union agreed,
at the last moment, upon a settlement and a withdrawal of the dispute from
arbitration. Generally, however, arbitration decisions are acceptable to both
sides.
Very few extreme settlements are made by arbitration boards. The
temporary factors which make other types of settlement so frequently reflect
sudden changes in bargaining power have much less effect upon arbitration
decisions. Standards capable of application under changing conditions come
to be recognized; changes in wages and working conditions are slower, and
consequently less responsive to local or temporary changes. These and other
elements in arbitration tend to bring small and continuous adjustments rather
than the large pendulum swings of industries where bargaining power alone
determines the settlement of labor disputes.
The long time history of wages in industries covered by arbitration
agreements shows that rates of pay rise by about the same amount as they
do in union establishments where wages are determined primarily with refer-
ence to the possibility of a successful strike. As would be expected, wages
rise more slowly and not nearly so far during periods of increasing business
activity, where arbitration is the rule; but during depression, the wage decline
is later and less under arbitration than where direct bargaining power deter-
mines settlements.
But in the extension of union power over employment conditions there
is no comparison whatever between direct bargaining, with the strike or
lockout threat in the offing, and the arbitration process. The establishment
or extension of a principle of union participation in personnel management
comes naturally, in arbitration, because the neutral arbitrator can see the
abstract and long time questions involved. Concessions wrung by the victor
from the loser after an open conflict are never secure; they may be, and
frequently are, lost in the next reversal of business conditions. Where
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decisions are made by arbitration, however, it is almost inevitable that the
union should be given a steadily larger share in the responsibility for labor
management, with corresponding limitations upon the power of the employer.
The. e is rarely any reversal of this tendency, and the arbitration process is
in fact building a more and more complete industrial democracy.
Union officials sometimes dislike the increased responsibility which
comes to them with their increased power. Many of them would prefer
arbitration decisions to be flat mandates, rather than-as they frequently
are--merely bases upon which the parties must cooperate for future handling
of the problem under consideration. But with responsibility labor organiza-
tions are gaining in stability. The demagogue type of leader, who comes to
the fore in strike situations, gives way to the more intelligent and responsible
labor leader when the union is forced to share responsibility for basic labor
decisions.
Settlement of disputes by arbitration, it may be said, leads to a stabiliza-
tion of wage changes, and to the steady extension of union responsibility in
industry. Settlements by strike, or under threat of strike, lockout, or other
direct action, are more extreme and more fluctuating, both as to wage rates
and as to union control of working conditions.
Arbitration and Direct Negotiation
As has been pointed out above, the direct settlement of labor contro-
versies is from every point of view the best method. But direct negotiation
is always carried on with an eye to the alternatives; it will be successful in
settling controversies only when both sides prefer not to handle them by
other available methods. Employer and union alike, therefore, can be con-
sidered as approaching any important dispute with an estimate in mind of the
advantages and disadvantages of settling in conference.
The arbitration process tends to give to each side in direct negotiation
a fairly definite basis for making such an estimate. The delays, the cost,
and to some degree the probable decision upon the dispute can be judged
fairly well. Each side knows that the other will have little difficulty in sub-
mitting the dispute to arbitration, if agreement cannot be reached. Even
though convinced of the justice of their own position, both sides know that
they may not be able to explain to an arbitrator, or to convince him. The
tendency to find a compromise, somewhere near the probable decision of the
impartial arbitrator, becomes steadily stronger.
Where the alternative to a negotiated settlement is the strike or lockout,
the atmosphere of the conference is very different. If one side or the other
cannot stand an open conflict, the negotiated settlement becomes as unfair as
the result of direct action would be. When each side feels it can win, the
negotiations often become nothing more than ultimatums. When one party
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or the other is definitely in a stronger fighting position, and tries to dictate
a settlement, the weaker party sometimes resorts to direct action in despair.
It is true, of course, that if employer and union were equally well informed,
and were each able to judge the other's attitude accurately, conferences even
where the only alternative was the strike or lockout might bring just and
speedy settlement. A few strikes, too, bring to each party a healthy respect
for the power of the other, and a reluctance to break off relations without
real justification. But on the whole, negotiated settlements where the strike
or the lockout is the alternative reflect the anticipated result of open conflict.
Direct negotiation, therefore, is carried on in a much better atmosphere,
and with much better prospect of a quick and equitable settlement of the
issues involved, where there is provision for arbitration by a neutral person.
Principles become settled, and clearly defined; the penalty or the discontent
attending delay puts a premium upon immediate adjustment. The arbitra-
tion machinery is needed less and less frequently, usually only for the han-
dling of major questions or the application of basic principles to entirely new
situations. Provision for the voluntary arbitration of labor disputes tends
to strengthen and extend the process of settlement by direct negotiation.
Adaptability of Arbitration
The types of disputes which have been submitted to and settled by
arbitration have been of almost every conceivable kind. Arbitration is
usually thought of as being best suited to controversies involving determina-
tions of facts, where settlement depends upon measurement or upon com-
promise based on quantitative data. Standard wage disputes are more or
less of that description, but the more significant though less well known
arbitration decisions in labor disputes have dealt with very different contro-
versies.
Among the questions which have been submitted to arbitration have
been those dealing with the displacement of labor by machinery. What
protection, if any, does an employer owe to his employees when he introduces
a machine which will put some of them out of work? Unemployment re-
serves, and employment guarantees, have been passed upon in arbitration
decisions. The complex problem of union status-beginning with recog-
nition, and proceeding through union preference to the closed union shop-
has all gone through the arbitration process. Disputes between company
unions and legitimate unions over employee representation have been decided
through the arbitration machinery of the Railway Labor Act. The right of
the employees to share in the control of casual or part time employment has
been recognized in arbitrations; the right of the employer to contract out
work covered by union agreement has been narrowly restricted by arbitration
decisions.
ARBITRATION OF LABOR DISPUTES
Jurisdictional questions, certainly not the least troublesome of labor
disputes, have several times been arbitrated in the railway industry. Reduc-
tions in employment have led to combining of different kinds of duties on
mary positions, and the question of union jurisdiction has naturally arisen.
In one such case, which was in form a dispute between a railway union and
the management, there appeared as aids to the management not only the
officers of another carrier, but also the officials of the other labor union
involved in the question. It is notoriously difficult to secure arbitration of
jurisdictional disputes between the labor organizations affected, but the
arbitration process has been able to surmount this difficulty by handling the
dispute as between the employer and one of the employee groups involved.
The other employee groups, of course, are not bound by such a decision, but
where their recourse is to arbitrate with the employer the probability is that
the decision of the first arbitration board will have great weight in succeeding
cases.
Adaptation of arbitration machinery to various kinds of disputes has
already been mentioned; the troublesome question of union recognition is
handled through secret balloting of the employees, the daily complaints and
grievances of employees are handled by special boards-trade boards, boards
of adjustment, etc.-designed to get just and speedy decision.
Conclusion
Arbitration has come to be very widely used in the settlement of labor
disputes. The result has been not only to reduce the danger of strikes and
lockouts, but also to secure equitable adjustment of labor relationships.
Agreements are interpreted, and their principles extended and developed, in
a way that secures stability in industry and an even development of the proc-
esses of collective bargaining. To encourage the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes by arbitration, there must be a frank recognition throughout industry
of the right of workers to organize, to bargain collectively, and to choose their
own representatives for bargaining free from all interference or influence of
their employer.
Government assistance in the development of arbitration can be carried
too far. Compulsory arbitration, with its implication of direct political
appointment of arbitrators, would do more to defeat than to aid in peaceful
settlement of labor disputes, unless limited to minor controversies. Given
proper encouragement by the public and by state and federal governments,
arbitration can be adapted to handle every type of labor dispute; it will result
in steady improvement in employer and employee organizations, and in
greater recognition of their responsibility to each other, to industry, and to
the community.
